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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
In the Interest of:
ERIKA R. P
VALLAREY L. P
Persons under 18 years of age.

, and

Case No.
13882

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the mother of Erika and Vallarey
P
from the denial of a motion to set aside the Juvenile
Court's order terminating parental rights of the mother.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, upon return to the State of Utah from Florida,
petitioned the Second Juvenile Court, Judge Judith Whitmer, to set
aside an order made by said Court terminating appellant's rights on
the grounds that the State of Utah had not exercised diligent
inquiry when attempting to serve and inform her of pending action,
making the resultant service by publication inadequate and void.
The motion of appellant was denied after the Court found suffi-
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cient diligence from the evidence presented.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the decision of the Juvenile
Court denying the motion to set aside the Court's order of permanent deprivation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In November of 1973, the appellant took her two children to a
friend's home to be taken care of for a few days (R.3). Direction
was given to this friend, Mrs. Brown, to take the children to Mrs.
Hattie P
, Mother of the Natural Father (R. 2-3). Thereafter the appellant left for Florida (R.3) without telling anyone where
she was going and for how long she would be gone (R.2-5).
Appellant testified that while in Florida she wrote letters to
Hattie P
but never received any reply. None of these
letters were returned to her. Appellant said she was not worried or
didn't think it was strange that Hattie did not answer (R.7).
No contact was made with any friend, family, or acquaintance
from November 1973 until March or April 1974 when appellant
contacted her sister who said the children were fine (R.4) when in
fact the children were no longer with Hattie but were under the care
of the Division of Family Services (R.19).
No further contact was made between the appellant and anyone
in Salt Lake (according to all testimony given) until appellant
returned to Utah. Thereafter it took 2-3 weeks for the appellant to
contact anyone who would know about the children (R.8).
Betty Mattson, a foster care worker for the Division of Family
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Services testified that she felt it necessary to deprive the parents of
the children because of circumstances amounting to abandonment,
for no contact or word had been made with the children or anyone
who was in charge of the children for over six months (R.20).
Irl Carlson, caseworker for the Division of Family Services,
testified that he checked at the post office to see if the appellant or
the father were receiving mail in the Salt Lake Valley or had left a
forwarding address (R.17). He further checked at the Baywood
Hotel where the children had been residing for a while, (R. 17). He
checked with Utah Power and Light to see if the appellant or the
father were customers of the company (R.18).
Darrell Meyers, another worker for the Division of Family
Services went to the home of Hattie P
to see if she knew
the whereabouts of the appellant; she did not know (R.18). He
further looked through the telephone book for the name of the
appellant's mother, but did not find it (R.19).
Lu Jean Smith, another case worker, also went to Hattie's to
see if she could find out where appellant was (R.20) and at the
same time checked with neighbors in the neighborhood where the
appellant last resided (R.20). All efforts were to no avail.
Service by publication was permitted based on the affidavit of
Irl Carlson alleging the foregoing (R. 17-18). Neither the appellant
nor the father were present at the shelter hearing in January 1974,
or the proceedings on July 16, 1974, at which time an order was
entered terminating rights (R.17). The reason the appellant or
father were not present was because of the inability to locate them
(R.17).
After the return of the appellant from Florida and within the
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time period permitted to challenge the order before it became final
(R.l), the appellant moved to set aside the order on the grounds
that no "diligent" effort had been made to locate her and inform
her of the proceedings. The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lw clearly set forth the Court's reasons for holding that a
diligent effort as required by Utah Code Annotated, Section
55-10-88 had been met and therefore denied the motion (R.30).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE MET ALL LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO LOCATE THE
APPELLANT, MAKING SERVICE BY PUBLICATION TOTALLY PERMISSIBLE AND BINDING
ON THE PARTIES TO THIS ACTION.
Respondent cannot help but agree with appellant's contention
that the deprivation of parental rights is a drastic action which must
be handled through In Personum procedures. Children are not
realty, and rights pertaining to them must be handled with care and
proper procedure. Appellant, however, wants this Court to believe
that such is an absolute standard which has very few exceptions, if
at all. This Court, as well as most every jurisdiction, recognizes
many ways personal jurisdiction can be perfected over parties —
even if they do not receive actual notice. Those procedures are
spelled out clearly and require little discussion here.
It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court has entertained this precise question earlier holding that jurisdiction
through publication is totally permissible and does not fail for lack
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oi due procedural safeguards when the inai.onn :-nd•» compliance
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(1972), this Court recognized the right to use publication when the
party to be served is out of the State or has so concealed himself
within the State making personal service impossible. The Service
by i>i*hiiv<iti-.,;i was challenged as denying due process to the
DefendanK . h u the Utah ('ouri Mated -> -ost emphatically that such
service of process is pemussihic
Appellant's contentions that Article 1, Secth-h ,: oi >hc luaii
Constitution prohibits the actions conducted in this case as a denial
of due process of !.** , ;.i> / therefore be dismissed as having been
settled b\ die ulnne ca%c Simply hu.ai!-;c ^cn^l ivUice is not
receded dot^ IM^ mean thai due process Has bee/' diveed.
Rule 4 (f) (1) of tl i.e Utah Rules of Cm! Procedure carefully
spells out the procedure necessary for service by publication. The
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instant matter:
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(b) If the address or whereabouts of the parent or
guardian outside the state cannot after diligent inquiry
be ascertained, by publishing a summons in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in which
the proceeding is pending. The summons shall be published once a week for four successive weeks. Service
shall be complete on the day of the last publication."
(Emphasis added)
This procedure when followed permits the Court, in a legal and
equitable sense, to adjudicate the matters before it. As the Oklahoma Court said in Bomford v. Socony Mobile Oil Co., 440 P. 2d
713 (Okl., 1968):
"Due diligence is a relative term lacking a fixed
content. It presents a question for judicial determination which must be decided in the first instance by the
trial court.'' (Emphasis added)
Further, in Knapp v. Sloper, 473 P.2d 140 (Or., 1970) that
Court held that due diligence requires a "reasonable effort" to
show why the party could not be found. Such reasonableness must
be defined by the terms or circumstances of a particular case, and if
the Court of first instance finds them sufficient, due process is met.
Appellant cites Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S. Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed 817 (1951) to
express certain criteria which must be followed to insure due
process to the nonpresent defendant. These criteria are analyzed as
follows: (1) The nature of the action is known, having been set up
by the legislature for the protection of the interests of children
within this state. (2) The procedure is carefully set forth as pro8
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vided by statute.(3) The testimony and total circumstances of the
case clearly establish why the action was taken — the parents had
abandoned the children, had not contacted them for nearly 10
months, left no indication that she was in the least interested in
their welfare. Surely the self serving declarations of love and
affection as expressed by the appellant must be viewed in the
context of the whole. (4) The only other alternative was to leave
the state of the children in "limbo" not knowing whether parents
(or appellant) would return or not. The welfare of the children
required action to be taken and it was. Now, inspite of the lack of
affection of the mother over this entire time period, she raises to
this court the argument that due process was not followed. She
complains of action she forced the State to take.
The record leaves the distinct impression that appellant did not
want anyone—not even her relatives—to know where she had
gone. She could have taken her children with her, but she was in
trouble with the law (R.6). This was a "self-induced hiding" not
letting anyone know where she was or why.
It is true that her affidavit explains where she was, but the
affidavit in several places is contradicted by appellant's own
testimony. She said she received a letter from Hattie P
,
but under oath denied making any contact (R.25, and R. 8). She
stated in her affidavit that she was unsuccessful in contacting her
mother until July (R. 26), when under oath she testified that she
contacted her mother through her sister in March and April (R.4).
Further she stated in the affidavit that Hattie P
knew the
address, that her mother knew her address, and that "all my family
and friends knew I was in Tampa, Florida" (R. 26)! Yet, all the
evidence presented at the hearing indicated otherwise. Such con9
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tradiction and self serving statements must be viewed in context of
the whole. When done so, in light of the criteria of Joint
Anti-Facist, there is no question that the process was in compliance with due process. The state cannot now be chastised for
acting on information that did not exist and could not be found at
the time the action was taken. The State thus acted in compliance
with all procedural and legal requirements.
POINT II
THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
STATE MET THE DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT IS SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE
Appellant would have this Court believe that as long as there is
one person or two persons who know the whereabouts of the party
to be served, that the other side (here the State) is obligated to keep
searching until that person is found. This is an admirable theory,
but one which cannot be accepted. To place this type of burden on
parties would totally prohibit any action at all—who is to know
that such a "knowledgeable" person exists. Further, what is to
guarantee that such person would divulge the location even if
found.
It is respondent's contention that such a strict standard as
propounded by Appellant's counsel is unrealistic in today's society. If the Court of first instance finds from the circumstances that
"due diligence" has been made, such a decision should be affirmed absent a showing of abuse. The Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law of this case give ample exposure to the
diligence conducted:
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"(a) They inquired of the neighbors in the area
where the mother had last resided.
(b) They inquired of the babysitter with whom the
children had been left who did not know the whereabouts of the parents.
(c) There was no forwarding address left at the
postoffice or at the last home address of the parents.
(d) They inquired of the mother of the natural father
who did not know the whereabouts of the mother and
father.
(e) They tried all of the people with the mother's
surname listed in the telephone book in an attempt to
locate the maternal grandmother." (R. 29 & 30)
The particulars to these findings of fact are set forth in
respondent's statement of facts and clearly substantiate the basis
for the findings made.
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
had a similar situation presented to it mMilosaujevic v. Brooks, 55
F.R.D. 543 (N.D. IND., 1972) where the Court found that "by
leaving the state and concealing her present location, has made
more adequate forms of service unreasonable and impracticable."
There, the Court found the following as being proper for service by
publication. Publication was made in a paper of the last known
address (that also was done here). Service was attempted at the last
known address (service was not attempted, but Social Workers
visited the area of Appellant's last known address and even talked
with neighbors, but could find no clue). The mother-in-law was
11
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contacted (here Hattie P
was contacted—the grandmother of the children as well as the baby-sitter). And, the insurance carrier was contacted (inapplicable here). Based on these four
acts, the District Court found diligent effort.
In this particular case, as cited in the Court's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law as well as in the statement of facts, it is
clearly observed that sufficient acts were done to satisfy the Court
that due diligence was complete.
Appellant makes the attempt to belittle the efforts of the Department of Social Services by listing several sources of information the Department should have checked. In analyzing these other
records it is seen that they would have added nothing in attempts to
locate the appellant. Vital statistics only give addresses at time of
birth and only the names of parents. Evidence at the hearing
indicated moving around and thus the address of several years
before was undoubtedly out of date. To go to the Hospital and find
out the doctor's name who "might " have a continuing relationship is most assuredly a stretch of the imagination under the rule.
Once again, it must be emphasized that if every person who knew
the appellant had to be contacted first, then in effect it would do
away with the rule. Tax rolls would not help to locate the appellant. Such records are awkward and burdensome and could not
locate the appellant out of state. Automobile registration and
drivers' license records were not valid sources because no change
of address (for leaving the state) was given and the Department
already knew her last known address. Judicial Records and city
records tell little more than what the Department already knew.
This foregoing analysis is only to indicate that though there are
countless records that "could" be searched, neither the law,
12
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reason, nor practicality require such extensive investigations. If,
under the circumstances, the Court finds that enough was done,
that decision should be upheld. Indeed, there is ample evidence to
indicate such diligence, for three workers for the State each made
attempts.
This Court said in Redwood Land v. Kimball, 20 Utah 2d 113,
433P.2d 1010 (1967) that:
' 'When the procedure prescribed for the acquisition
of jurisdiction of the defendant has been properly carried out that is, when there has been a correct service of
a proper summons, a mistake of this kind (Failing to
'prove' service within 5 days) does not destroy the
validity of the service itself.''
Here, there was proper service (publication as per the rules and
direction of the Court) of a proper summons. No mistake was made
in the instant matter, for the Court made a judicial determination
that proper "diligence" had been carried out. Therefore, the
validity, as well as the jurisdiction of the Court was proper,
making the order thereof enforceable.
POINT III
STATUTORY LANGUAGE DOES NOT REQUIRE
ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE APPELLANT WAS OUTSIDE OF THE STATE IN ORDER
FOR SERVICE BY PUBLICATION TO BE BINDING.
Appellant reads something into the language of Utah Code
Annotated, Section 55-10-88, that does not appear. The statute, as
13
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quoted earlier, states that if the parents "cannot be found within
the state" then publication is permissible if the address outside the
state cannot be ascertained. In the present action, the appellant was
in fact outside the state. Any new address of the Appellant could
not be ascertained; Appellant could not be found within the state
and no indication of where she had gone was available. Appellant
left no word of her whereabouts for months and in fact, testified
that it didn't bother her that nobody wrote (R.7), if it can be
believed that anyone did know her whereabouts. Such facts clearly
satisfy the requirements as prescribed by the Utah Code.
The fact that the State could not find any indication of what had
happened to the Appellant shows that no more could be done and
that as this Court stated in Lloyd, supra:
On the other hand, a summons published once a
week for four successive weeks in a newspaper having
general circulation in the county wherein the plaintiff
resides would likely be seen by the defendant or by
some acquaintance or relative of the defendant who
would give notice of the pending matter to him."
Therefore, the State did all it could to look out for the welfare
of the children who were left without thought or regard by the
Appellant and who made no more than a feeble attempt at most to
communicate to them or anyone knowing their condition. This
argument must therefore be considered without merit since the
code specifically permits publication when the parents are "in
fact" outside the state.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that procedural
safeguards and due diligence on the part of the State have been
complied with, thus requiring this Court to affirm the decision of
the lower Court.
THEREFORE, the Respondent respectfully submits that the
denial of the Motion appealed from be sustained.
Respectfully subnitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
FRANK V. NELSON
Assistant Attorney General
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